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I. Introduction 
In August 2014, EA Sports, a gaming empire, released the 
fifteenth version of Madden NFL, a video game that allows the 
player to simulate a professional football game using avatar 
versions of NFL players.1 The Madden NFL series warrants 
praise for its immense success—more than 100 million copies sold 
over the last twenty-five years—and for its realism, as “[t]he NFL 
superstars definitely look like their real life counterparts would.”2 
Consistent with the game’s goal to become more realistic with 
each release, Madden NFL 15 boasted the new addition of one 
player’s tattoos, while simultaneously adding in some legal issues 
concerning copyright law.3  
                                                                                                     
 1. See Becky Sullivan, For the First Time, Real Tattoos Make Their 
Madden Debut, NPR (Aug. 24, 2014, 6:27 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/ 
08/24/342959404/for-the-first-time-real-tattoos-make-their-madden-debut (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2015) (noting the release of the newest installment of the 
Madden series) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 2. See id. (recounting the enormous success of the Madden series and its 
shift towards increasingly realistic depictions of NFL players); see also Nick 
Bilton, Video Game Industry Continues Major Growth, Gartner Says, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 5, 2011, 6:55 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/05/video-game-
industry-continues-major-growth-gartner-says (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) 
(emphasizing the video game industry boom that continues to this day, making 
the video game industry an important player in legal issues) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 3. See Samit Sarkar, Why Tattoos Are Just Now Returning to Madden 
with Madden NFL 15, POLYGON (June 5, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://www.polygon. 
com/2014/6/5/5782540/madden-nfl-15-tattoos-returning-colin-kaepernick (last 
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During an interview with Polygon, Madden NFL’s line 
producer4 Sean Graddy confirmed that concerns about tattoos 
and copyright prevented tattoos from previously appearing in the 
popular video game series once it transitioned to high-definition 
consoles.5 Colin Kaepernick, quarterback for the San Francisco 
49ers, remains the only player with tattoos in Madden 15, as the 
process of securing licenses from Kaepernick’s tattoo artists took 
“a fair amount of work.”6 Madden’s desire to depict players’ 
tattoos sparked a flurry of queries regarding the legal 
ramifications of including replicas of tattoos in the video game, 
with freshly minted legal scholars concluding both that tattoos 
deserved copyright protection and that players fundamentally 
possessed autonomy over their own persons.7  
                                                                                                     
visited Nov. 6, 2015) (explaining why Madden has not previously included 
players’ tattoos and how it plans to proceed in securing the necessary licensing 
to include more players’ ink in future Madden games) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 4. See Brett McKay & Kate McKay, So You Want My Job: Video Game 
Producer, ART OF MANLINESS (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.artofmanliness.com/ 
2010/09/29/so-you-want-my-job-video-game-producer/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) 
(describing the tasks of a video game line producer, which include overseeing 
development of a game) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 5. See Sarkar, supra note 3 (citing Sean Graddy as saying, “It really comes 
down to a piece of art asset here that could be [copyrighted], frankly, as we’ve 
learned over time”).  
 6. See id. (describing how Kaepernick first secured permission from his 
tattoo artists before Madden would consider including his tattoos in the newly 
released game); see also Darren A. Heitner & Alan Wilmot, Score a Touchdown, 
Kiss Your Tattoo, and Get Sued for Copyright Infringement?, 21 JEFFREY S. 
MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 299, 318–19 (2014) (recounting how an account 
management representative at a sports agency company spent thousands of 
hours researching and cold-calling to obtain partnerships with LeBron James 
and Kobe Bryant’s tattoo artists so he could use their tattoos on merchandise); 
Joseph Milord, Colin Kaepernick Will Be the Only Player in Madden 15 with 
Tattoos, ELITE DAILY (June 6, 2014, 10:46 AM), http://elitedaily.com/sports/colin-
kaepernick-will-be-the-only-player-in-madden-15-with-tattoos/622374/ (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2015) (identifying Kaepernick as the only player whose animated 
avatar will include his own tattoos) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 7. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, Whose Tattoo Is It 
Anyway?, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-
raustiala-tattoo-copyright-20131006-story.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2015) 
(opining on the question “who owns a tattoo?” and recognizing the conflicting 
rights of athletes and tattoo artists) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
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The copyrightability of tattoos, however, does not just affect 
the booming video game market.8 The NFL continues to sign 
multi-billion dollar contracts to broadcast its games, which also 
display players’ body art.9 Professional athletes and their tattoos 
pop up everywhere: magazines frequently feature players’ barely 
clad bodies, and ESPN even dedicates an entire edition of its 
magazine to include images of unadorned athletes.10 Television 
networks, magazine publishers, and video game creators all need 
answers regarding their legal exposure when it comes to 
featuring athletes’ tattoos, but not a single court has addressed 
the issue head-on.11  
This Note examines the limited and uncertain cases and 
scholarship discussing tattoos and concludes that the current 
precedent provides insufficient guidance in applying copyright 
protection to tattoos. It addresses this lack of supervision by 
analyzing the existing scholarship suggestions that justify 
copyright protection for tattoos and subsequently dismisses those 
suggestions in favor of an alternative and new position.  
                                                                                                     
 8. See Christine Lesicko, Tattoos As Visual Art: How Body Art Fits into 
the Visual Artists Rights Act, 53 IDEA 39, 61 (2013) (noting that a precedential 
ruling regarding the copyrightability of tattoos would affect the internet’s 
plethora of tattoo art and artist resources, along with other media sources).  
 9. See, e.g., Kurt Badenhausen, The NFL Signs TV Deals Worth $27 
Billion, FORBES (Dec. 24, 2011, 6:13 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurt 
badenhausen/2011/12/14/the-nfl-signs-tv-deals-worth-26-billion/ (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2015) (announcing the NFL’s nine-year extension to its broadcast 
packages with Fox, NBC, and CBS, under which the networks will pay 
approximately sixty percent more than previous agreements) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 10. See Heitner & Wilmot, supra note 6, at 299 (pointing out that, out of 
the fifty-four photos in the fifth annual Body Issue, nine showcased athletes 
with extensive body art); Nancy Szokan, ESPN Magazine Body Issue Shows Off 
Naked Athletes, Their Muscles and Tattoos, WASH. POST (July 21, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/espn-magazine-body-
issue-shows-off-naked-athletes-their-muscles-and-tattoos/2014/07/21/71930926-
0b76-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (“We can 
also see pretty much all of running back Marshawn Lynch (impressive tattoos) 
and Texas Ranger Prince Fielder (also sporting some dramatic body art as well 
as a pronounced—and yet not flabby—belly) . . . .”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 11. See Yolanda M. King, The Challenges “Facing” Copyright Protection for 
Tattoos, 92 OR. L. REV. 129, 129–30 (2013) (remarking on the lack of precedent 
regarding the copyrightability of tattoos).  
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Part II discusses the Copyright Act of 197612 and debates its 
applicability to tattoos from a textual perspective.13 Part III 
examines the three major cases involving copyright and 
tattoos—Reed v. Nike, Inc.,14 Whitmill v. Warner Brothers 
Entertainment, Inc.,15 and Allen v. Electronic Arts, Inc.16—all of 
which ended in confidential settlement agreements.17 Part IV 
recounts the alternative solutions that the scholarship offers to 
deal with the public policy problem of giving tattoos copyright 
protection and criticizes the authorities’ approaches; it also 
introduces a practical solution that the National Football 
League Players Association (NFLPA) proposed but doubts its 
actual practicality.18 Part V presents this Note’s suggested 
approach—denying tattoos copyright protection for all 
nonfeatured uses of the artwork—and explains the rationale 
and public policy supporting this novel test.19 
                                                                                                     
 12. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2012). 
 13. Infra Part II. This Note does not venture into the First Amendment 
issues surrounding tattoo artists and their clients, although courts and scholars 
have addressed those questions. See, e.g., Alexa L. Nickow, Note, Getting Down 
to (Tattoo) Business: Copyright Norms and Speech Protections for Tattooing, 20 
MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 183, 185 (2013) (comparing the unquestioned 
First Amendment protection for tattoos as symbolic speech with the reluctance 
of courts to recognize the process of tattooing as speech). See generally Anderson 
v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2010); Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC 
v. City of N. Chi., 580 F. Supp. 2d 656 (N.D. Ill. 2008); Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 
F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1980); State v. White, 560 S.E.2d 420 (S.C. 2002).  
 14. Complaint at 1, Reed v. Nike, Inc., No. 3:05-CV-00198 (D. Or. Feb. 10, 
2005) [hereinafter Nike Complaint].  
 15. Complaint at 1, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., No. 4:11-
CV-00752 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Warner Brothers Complaint].  
 16. Complaint at 1, Allen v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-03172 (W.D. La. 
Dec. 31, 2012) [hereinafter Electronic Arts Complaint].  
 17. Infra Part III.  
 18. Infra Part IV.  
 19. Infra Part V.  
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II. The Copyright Act of 1976: Questioning Its Applicability to 
Tattoos 
A. What the Copyright Act Protects  
The Copyright Act protects “original works of authorship 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine or device.”20 The Act goes on to define “works of 
authorship” more specifically, which relevantly include “pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works.”21 Two aspects of the tattooing 
process warrant analysis under the Act’s framework: the flash 
design and the final inked-on-skin product.22 The flash “is the 
collection of designs for tattoos in a tattoo shop; tattoo parlors 
traditionally display flash on large pieces of paper throughout the 
shop for customers to select or use as inspiration.”23 Without a 
doubt, flash garners copyright protection, as it parallels works 
that traditionally deserve protection under the Act, such as 
paintings.24  
The copyrightability of tattoos on skin, on the other hand, 
seems less certain, but scholars generally accept that tattoos 
meet the requirements set forth in the Act, which explains the 
lack of discourse questioning that conclusion.25 Textually 
                                                                                                     
 20. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (outlining the subject 
matter of copyright).  
 21. See id. § 102(a)(1)–(8) (listing the various categories that constitute 
works of authorship). 
 22. See JOHN REARDON, THE COMPLETE IDIOT’S GUIDE TO GETTING A TATTOO 
32 (2008) (differentiating between flash designs and tattoos inked on clients’ 
skin).  
 23. See id. (noting that flash serves dual purposes: giving clients immediate 
designs to choose from and serving as good reference material for clients when 
brainstorming from their own personal inspiration).  
 24. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” 
to mean “two-dimensional . . . works of fine, graphic, and applied art,” including 
“prints and art reproductions” and “technical drawings”).  
 25. See Heitner & Wilmot, supra note 6, at 305–06 (“[I]t is commonly 
accepted that tattoos fall within the ambit categories that qualify for copyright 
protection.”); Lauren Etter, Ink Inc.: As Tattoos Become Big Business, Tattoo 
Artists Are Asserting Their Copyright Claims, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2014, at 9 (“And 
now it’s increasingly clear that the law also applies to ink on skin.”); Jacob 
Gershman, Athletes’ Tattoo Artists File Copyright Suits, Leaving Indelible Mark, 
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speaking, if a tattoo possesses a mere modicum of originality, 
qualifies as a work of authorship, and appears fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression, it should obtain copyright protection 
according to the elements listed in the Act.26 Scholars mostly 
agree that “copyright protection can logically be extended to 
tattoos” when applying the originality, works of authorship, and 
fixation requirements.27 
Despite the overwhelming scholarly consensus, some scholars 
argue that tattoos fail to meet the previously mentioned 
requirements in order to eliminate the problems associated with 
tattoos and copyright.28 Clearly, a tattoo inherently possesses 
some amount of originality, and the law requires only a minimal 
degree of creativity, making a challenge to this element of 
copyrightable subject matter nearly impossible to win.29 Tattoos 
                                                                                                     
WALL ST. J. (June 16, 2014, 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/athletes-
tattoo-artists-want-more-skin-in-the-game-1402972074 (last visited Nov. 6, 
2015) (“[L]awyers and scholars say there is no obvious reason why tattoo artists 
shouldn’t be covered by the same rights granted to photographers or other 
visual artists.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 26. See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text (paraphrasing the Act’s 
definition of copyrightable subject matter).  
 27. See David M. Cummings, Note, Creative Expression and the Human 
Canvas: An Examination of Tattoos As Copyrightable Art Form, 2013 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 279, 304 (2013) (separating tattoos into two distinctive categories for 
analysis of whether they can and should be copyrighted—tattoos based off of a 
sketch or flash and then applied to the skin compared to tattoos originally 
created on the skin). This distinction mainly addresses the problematic 
characterization of human skin as a “useful article,” although courts using the 
conceptual separability test resolve this dilemma without complication. Id. at 
302. A “useful article” is a staple article of commerce, which a human body is 
not. Id. As an analogy, the “useful article” exception means that the painting on 
a canvas garners copyright protection, but the canvas itself does not. Id. The 
debate regarding conceptual separability and useful articles, however, remains 
ongoing. See Barton R. Keyes, Alive and Well: The (Still) Ongoing Debate 
Surrounding Conceptual Separability in American Copyright Law, 69 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 109, 109–10 (2008) (noting that the copyrightability of designs on useful 
articles remains “one of the most confusing aspects of American copyright law”).  
 28. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (outlining the subject 
matter of copyright under the Act); infra note 166 and accompanying text 
(concluding, for public policy reasons, that the Act does not extend copyright 
protection to human bodies).  
 29. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) 
(noting that the requisite level of creativity to qualify for copyright protection is 
“extremely low”). Although the argument appears very weak, some unoriginal 
tattoo designs might not meet the minimal degree of creativity required, similar 
to the telephone directories in Feist. See id. at 340 (“The constitutional 
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also objectively qualify as works of authorship because of their 
pictorial and graphic nature.30  
The only realistic challenge to whether tattoos deserve the 
label of copyrightable subject matter involves their fixed nature, 
and whether skin qualifies as a tangible medium of expression.31 
As skin ages, stretches, shrinks, burns, and varies pigments, a 
tattoo on that changing skin morphs as well, calling into question 
whether a tattoo can ever be fixed.32 Tattoos, however, ultimately 
possess a rather permanent quality and thus defeat this 
argument.33 Skin can most certainly serve as a tangible medium 
of expression.34 Therefore, challenging whether tattoos meet the 
requirements for copyrightable subject matter does not 
successfully answer the question of their protection.  
                                                                                                     
requirement necessitates independent creation plus a modicum of creativity.”). 
A common example includes an unchanged image of the American flag, which 
requires no creativity from the tattoo artist whatsoever. This Note does not 
address these types of tattoos. If a tattoo artist inks a “cultural heritage” or 
Aboriginal design, such as a Native American symbol, that type of tattoo 
escapes the categorization as copyrightable subject matter, too. See Nash v. 
CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990) (“No one invents even a tiny 
fraction of the ideas that make up our cultural heritage.”). These tattoos do not 
receive copyright protection because the originality belongs to the associated 
group. See id. (denying copyright protection for Nash’s work because he merely 
analyzed history and culture but failed to add any of his own expression to the 
work at issue). This Note does not address tattoos implicating cultural heritage 
issues, either.  
 30. See supra note 21 (defining a work of authorship).  
 31. See infra note 164 and accompanying text (noting Nimmer’s belief that 
the human body does not, and for public policy purposes cannot, qualify as a 
medium of expression under the Copyright Act).  
 32. See Declaration of David Nimmer at 6–7, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. 
Entm’t, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-00752 (E.D. Mo. May 20, 2011) [hereinafter Nimmer 
Declaration] (determining that if a court found that a tattoo qualified for 
copyright protection under the Act, then a court could bar the wearer from 
removing a tattoo or altering the original tattoo in any way, including changes 
to the wearer’s skin). 
 33. See Olga Khazan, The Secret to a Tattoo’s Permanence: The Immune 
System, THE ATLANTIC (July 22, 2014, 10:52 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
health/archive/2014/07/the-real-reason-tattoos-are-permanent/374825/ (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2015) (“The dye gets lodged deep in the skin thanks to hungry 
anti-inflammatory cells called macrophages.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 34. But see Nimmer Declaration, supra note 32, at 4 (concluding that Mr. 
Tyson’s head could not constitute a protectable medium of expression).  
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B. Tattoo Artists’ Rights Under the Copyright Act 
The owner of a copyright possesses certain exclusive rights, 
including the right to reproduce the copyrighted work, the right 
to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work, the 
right to distribute copies of the copyrighted work, and the right to 
publicly display the copyrighted work.35 The inclusion of tattoos 
in Madden NFL 15 implicates all of these rights. Copying the 
design of a real tattoo and placing it on a digital version of a 
player in the video game constitutes a reproduction of the tattoo, 
infringing on the tattoo artist’s exclusive reproduction right.36 
Selling millions of copies of the popular video game violates the 
artist’s exclusive right to distribute.37 Recreating the original 
tattoo in a digital format explicitly creates a derivative version of 
the original work, violating the artist’s exclusive right to all 
derivative works.38 Finally, and most controversially, whenever 
                                                                                                     
 35. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (listing the rights of 
the author of a work copyrighted according to the Copyright Act).  
 36. See 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 7.2 (3d ed. 2014) (noting that 
limitations on the exclusive right of reproduction generally divide between 
limitations based on the type of copyrighted work involved and limitations based 
on the type of use of the copyrighted work). EA Sports’ utilization of copyrighted 
tattoos would invoke both of these types of violations, as pictorial types of works 
garner more protection and identical copying qualifies as an extremely 
reprehensible use of a copyrighted work. See id. (discussing the differences 
between limitations on the right to reproduce a copyrighted work).  
 37. See id.  § 5.5 (2d ed. 2004) (“Section 106(3) of the Copyright Act gives a 
copyright owner the exclusive right to distribute, and to authorize others to 
distribute, ‘copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale 
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.’”). This right 
effectively envelops the important right of first publication by preventing all 
forms of transfer, not just sale. See id. (describing the broad coverage of the 
right to distribute the copyrighted work and emphasizing the importance of this 
exclusive right to copyright holders).  
 38. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (defining a derivative work as “a work based upon 
one or more pre-existing works,” which includes any form in which a work may 
be recast, transformed, or adapted). A work is not derivative, however, unless it 
has substantially copied from a prior work. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.01 (Matthew Bender rev. ed., 50th ed. 2014) 
(distinguishing a new work from a derivative work). Creating a video game 
version of a copyrighted work qualifies as making an infringing, derivative 
work. See Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(finding that Micro Star’s use of Formgen’s MAP files in its own video game with 
different characters infringed on Formgen’s copyright by creating a violative, 
derivative work).  
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the recipient of the tattoo appears in public, he violates the 
artist’s right to publicly display the copyrighted work.39 With a 
mountain of violations to support his claim, the tattoo artist’s 
case appears strong to recover damages for copyright 
infringement, and the cases discussed in Part III generally 
agree.40 
III. (Questionable) Precedent: What the Cases Suggest 
A. Reed v. Nike, Inc. 
Matthew Reed, an Oregon tattoo artist, and Rasheed 
Wallace, an NBA basketball player, first interacted in 1998 on a 
recommendation to Wallace from a fellow athlete.41 Wallace and 
Reed met and discussed the artwork that Reed would eventually 
ink onto Wallace’s arm; Wallace provided the initial idea of 
incorporating an “Egyptian themed family design” into his tattoo, 
while Reed relied on his education and experience to design the 
tattoo.42 After finalizing the design, Reed created the stencil that 
would help transfer the agreed-upon drawing onto Wallace’s 
skin.43 Over their next three meetings, Reed applied the design 
                                                                                                     
 39. See R. Anthony Reese, The Public Display Right: The Copyright Act’s 
Neglected Solution to the Controversy Over RAM “Copies,” 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 
83, 84 (2001) (matching the changes in technology to the previously 
unappreciated right of public display). Interestingly, the author recognizes that 
the public display right “create[s] significant problems as more and more works 
are used in digital form” and that the display right “has the potential to give 
copyright owners excessive control over the use of their works.” Id.  
 40. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (outlining the various remedies and damages 
available to a victim of copyright infringement). Importantly, to recover 
statutory damages, an artist must have registered the copyright before filing 
suit. See, e.g., Pye v. Mitchell, 574 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting that only 
a proprietor of a statutory copyright at the time of the acts of infringement can 
collect damages). In other words, registering for a copyright after the acts of 
infringement occur makes a potential victim ineligible to recover statutory 
damages under the Act, and an artist would struggle to prove actual damages as 
a result of the infringement. Id.  
 41. See Nike Complaint, supra note 14, at 3 (describing the initial 
interaction between Reed and Wallace after recounting Reed’s career 
development). 
 42. See id. (noting who contributed what to Wallace’s tattoo).  
 43. See id. (recounting what occurred during the second meeting between 
Reed and Wallace).  
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onto Wallace’s arm, for which Wallace paid Reed $450,44 an 
amount Reed considered inadequate except for the “exposure” he 
believed he might receive as a result of Wallace’s fame as an NBA 
player.45  
Reed obtained Copyright Registration Number VA 1-265-074 
for the “Egyptian Family Pencil Drawing” that he then applied to 
Wallace’s arm using the flash he designed.46 Somewhat ironically, 
Reed admitted in his Complaint that he wanted Wallace to 
violate his exclusive rights as the registrant of the copyright on 
the tattoo design by publicly displaying the tattoo at NBA games 
and garnering Reed widespread recognition for his work.47 Reed 
“believed that he and his business would receive exposure as a 
result of the tattoo being on an NBA player” and “observed the 
tattoo during televised NBA games,” a public display that Reed 
describes as “expected” and “common in the tattoo industry.”48 By 
indicating his acceptance of some violations of his exclusive rights 
connected to his copyright, Reed demonstrated reluctance in his 
argument that the artist must be sole owner of the exclusive 
                                                                                                     
 44. As a point of reference, Colin Kaepernick’s famed tattoo artist Nes 
Andrion charges $120 for every hour that a tattoo takes to ink, with most of 
Kaepernick’s tattoos taking well over four hours to complete. See Scott Soshnick, 
Tattoo Artist Nabs $16 Million in Free Ads with Kaepernick’s Ink, BLOOMBERG 
(Jan. 30, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-30/tattoo-
artist-nabs-16-million-in-free-ads-with-kaepernick-s-ink.html (last visited Nov. 
6, 2015) (highlighting the benefits that Kaepernick’s tattoo artist received as a 
result of Kaepernick’s high level of exposure) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). Wallace’s tattoo took three separate sessions, with an average 
session lasting between four and six hours. See Julie H. Rose, Long Tattoo 
Session, TATTOO HELP DESK (Sept. 23, 2008, 1:37 AM), http://tattoohelpdesk. 
blogspot.com/2008/09/long-tattoo-sessions.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) 
(describing that a “sleeve,” or full arm tattoo, could exceed thirteen hours of 
work, and that most people cannot sit through more than four hours of tattooing 
at a time) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Assuming 
Wallace’s tattooing process took three sessions of four hours each at a price of 
$120 per hour, Wallace paid over $1,000 for the final tattoo.  
 45. See Nike Complaint, supra note 14, at 3–4 (describing the final 
tattooing process when Reed transferred the collaborative design onto Wallace’s 
skin).  
 46. See id. at 4 (pointing out that Reed did obtain a copyright for the 
drawing inked onto Wallace’s arm).  
 47. See id. (noting that Reed witnessed some public displays of the tattoo 
by Wallace and actually expected those violations of his exclusive rights).  
 48. Id.  
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rights.49 But in the spring of 2004, things went too far—Reed 
found out that Nike planned to highlight the tattoo on Wallace’s 
arm as part of an advertising campaign.50  
The Nike commercial features two separate tattoos on 
Wallace’s body: a bulldog not designed or inked by Reed and the 
Egyptian version of Wallace’s family mentioned above.51 In the 
advertisement, Wallace describes both tattoos and their meaning, 
as a simulated version of the creation process fills them in on his 
arms.52 Reed claimed that neither Nike nor Wallace contacted 
him about the featured use of his original artwork in the 
commercial, and he subsequently sued both Nike and Wallace.53 
Reed accused Nike of infringing on his copyright by reproducing, 
distributing, adapting, and publicly displaying his original design 
without his consent, permission, or authority.54  
Reed also sued Wallace on two separate counts: first, for 
contributory infringement55 of Reed’s copyright, and second, in 
                                                                                                     
 49. See id. (admitting that Reed expected and desired some violations of 
the exclusive rights of reproduction, creating derivative works, publicly 
displaying, and distributing copies of the copyrighted work).  
 50. See id. (“Mr. Reed became aware that the tattoo he had applied to Mr. 
Wallace’s arm was being featured as part of an advertising campaign including 
a commercial for Nike highlighting Mr. Wallace.”).  
 51. See robjv1, Rasheed Wallace NBA Finals Nike Commercial, YOUTUBE 
(June 26, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RqmRu34PXrU (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2015) (showing the Nike commercial featuring Wallace’s tattoos) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 52. See id. (featuring Wallace’s voice, which describes his tattoos as they 
appear on his arms, using a computer simulation technique).  
 53. See Nike Complaint, supra note 14, at 4 (describing Nike’s wrongful 
conduct as it related to Reed).  
 54. See id. at 4–5 (outlining Reed’s first claim for recovery against Nike).  
 55. Contributory infringement serves as a “separate avenue for third-party 
liability in the copyright sphere,” distinct from direct copyright infringement 
liability. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, § 12.04[A][3] (describing the 
separate liability of related defendants in copyright infringement actions); G. 
PETER ALBERT, JR. & AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW IN CYBERSPACE 172 (2d ed. 2011) (imposing liability for 
contributory infringement on defendants who are “not directly responsible for 
the infringing act, but ha[ve] played a significant role in the direct infringement 
committed by others”); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster 
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005) (attempting to accuse Grokster of contributory 
infringement, although ultimately failing). Contributory infringement can 
consist of “personal conduct that forms part of or furthers the infringement and 
contribution of machinery or goods that provide the means to infringe.” NIMMER 
& NIMMER, supra note 38, § 12.04[A][3]. The first type of contributory 
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the alternative, for an accounting of his share in any revenue 
Wallace garnered as a result of the use of the tattoo.56 Reed’s first 
claim for relief against Wallace accused Wallace of misleading 
Nike as to the ownership of the intellectual property associated 
with the tattoo and therefore contributing to Nike’s infringement 
on Reed’s copyright.57 Alternatively, Reed recognized that if 
“Rasheed Wallace is the co-owner with [Reed] of the Copyright in 
the artwork embodied in the tattoo on his upper arm, [Reed] is 
entitled to share in any revenue realized by Mr. Wallace as the 
result of any use, other than incidental use, of the tattoo.”58 With 
this claim, Reed admitted the possibility that Wallace might have 
an ownership interest in the tattoo as well, clouding Reed’s claim 
to the exclusive rights associated with his copyright. 
Reed filed his original Complaint in February 2005, and the 
clerk of the court entered an Order of Dismissal of the case in 
October of that same year.59 Some scholars considered Reed the 
                                                                                                     
infringement, participation in infringement, occurs when a party, with 
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes 
to the infringing conduct of another. See id. (denoting liability of a “contributory 
infringer”). Knowledge that the work in question qualifies as an infringement 
remains key to finding the first type of contributory infringement. See id. (“In 
sum, then, given knowledge that the work in question constitutes an 
infringement, then one who causes another to infringe will himself be liable as 
an infringer . . . .”). To reiterate, the Supreme Court described a contributory 
infringer as someone “in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by 
others and had authorized the use without permission from the copyright 
owner.” Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437 (1984). The 
second type of contributory infringement, providing means to infringe, occurs 
when one, with knowledge, furnishes a copyrighted work to another, who then 
wrongfully copies from that work. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, 
§ 12.04[A][3][b] (outlining the requirements for contributory infringement by 
providing means to infringe to another).  
 56. See Nike Complaint, supra note 14, at 6–7 (claiming that Wallace 
advised Nike that he possessed exclusive ownership of the intellectual property 
rights in connection with the tattoo, contributing to Nike’s infringement of 
Reed’s copyright by so doing, and alternatively asserting that Wallace share 
profits from use of the tattoo with Reed). 
 57. See id. at 6 (“Defendant Wallace’s conduct induced, caused or 
materially contributed to the unauthorized reproduction, adaptation, public 
display and/or distribution of copies of the Plaintiff’s Copyrighted Work without 
the consent or authority of Plaintiff in violation of Sections 106 and 501 of the 
Copyright Act . . . .”).  
 58. Id. at 7.  
 59. See id. at 1 (dating the filing of Reed’s Complaint as February 10, 
2005); Order of Dismissal at 1, Reed v. Nike, Inc., No. 3:05-CV-00198 (D. Or. 
1960 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1947 (2015) 
first case to assert copyright infringement based on a tattoo and 
believed that the case might open the floodgates for other 
lawsuits similar in nature.60 As evidenced by the lacking 
precedent and ambiguous law addressing tattoos’ 
copyrightability, Reed did no such thing. The case settled out of 
court, and the settlement agreement remains confidential, just 
like the following two cases involving tattoos and accusations of 
copyright infringement.61  
B. Whitmill v. Warner Brothers Entertainment, Inc. 
Perhaps the most (in)famous of the tattoo and copyright 
cases, Whitmill v. Warner Brothers Entertainment, Inc. involved 
the much anticipated release of The Hangover: Part II and Mike 
Tyson’s face tattoo62 artist, Victor Whitmill.63 Whitmill designed 
and applied the original tattoo to Tyson’s face in 2003, and Tyson 
signed a release acknowledging that Whitmill would own the 
artwork and copyright to the tattoo.64 Eight years later, Warner 
Brothers began advertising the release of The Hangover: Part II, 
a sequel to the highly successful The Hangover, which depicted 
three straight-laced friends who had some fun while getting into 
trouble in Las Vegas.65 Both the trailer for the sequel and the 
                                                                                                     
Oct. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Nike Order of Dismissal] (“[T]his action is dismissed 
with prejudice . . . .”).  
 60. See Christopher A. Harkins, Tattoos and Copyright Infringement: 
Celebrities, Marketers, and Businesses Beware of the Ink, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 313, 315, 316 n.5 (2006) (analyzing and predicting what effects Reed v. 
Wallace might have on future copyright infringement cases).  
 61. See Ira Boudway, Hey Pro Athletes: Your Tattoo Is Going to Get You 
Sued, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/ 
articles/2013-09-04/hey-pro-athletes-your-tattooed-arms-are-going-to-get-you-
sued (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (observing that Reed’s case settled very quickly 
after he filed it) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 62. See Warner Brothers Complaint, supra note 15, at Exhibit 4 (depicting 
Mike Tyson with his face tattoo as a point of reference for the remainder of the 
Complaint). See generally THE HANGOVER: PART II (Warner Brothers 2011).  
 63. Warner Brothers Complaint, supra note 15, at 1.  
 64. See id. at 2–3 (“Among his creations is one of the most distinctive 
tattoos in the nation, an original design he created on the upper left side of 
former world heavyweight champion boxer Mike Tyson’s face.”).  
 65. See id. at Exhibit 6 (depicting a poster advertisement of the upcoming 
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movie poster featured a duplicate of Tyson’s tattoo on one of the 
actor’s faces.66  
Like Reed a few years before him, Whitmill sued Warner 
Brothers for infringing on his exclusive rights to the original 
Mike Tyson tattoo under the Copyright Act.67 In his Complaint, 
he asserted that both the trailer and the poster constituted 
unauthorized copying, distributing, and publicly displaying of the 
copyrighted work, and that the version of the tattoo used in the 
film qualified as an unauthorized derivative work.68 Whitmill 
cleverly sought both injunctive and monetary relief, putting 
Warner Brothers at risk of foregoing the release of the film 
altogether.69  
Similar to Reed, the parties settled outside of court quickly 
after the filing of Whitmill’s Complaint, partially due to Warner 
Brothers’ request for speediness to avoid delaying the release of 
the film or having to digitally alter the tattoo throughout the 
entire film.70 In fact, the case settled less than two months after 
                                                                                                     
film The Hangover: Part II, which clearly copies Mike Tyson’s tattoo); IGN, The 
Hangover Part 2: Official Movie Trailer, YOUTUBE (Apr. 1, 2011), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=snlWDffZfyk (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) 
(showing the sequel’s trailer, which includes the actor with a replica of Tyson’s 
face tattoo for over half of the advertisement’s duration) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also A.O. Scott, Dudes Doing Vegas: 
Eating and Other Stuff, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com 
/2009/06/05/movies/05hang.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (describing the 
plotline and characters of the first The Hangover movie) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 66. See Warner Brothers Complaint, supra note 15, at Exhibit 6 (showing a 
copied version of Tyson’s tattoo on the movie poster for the film); id. at 5 
(describing the heavy use of the pirated replica in the promotional materials for 
the film).  
 67. See id. at 7 (claiming that Warner Brothers infringed on all of his 
exclusive rights to the original tattoo).  
 68. See id. (listing his claims for recovery against Warner Brothers for 
infringing on his exclusive rights under the Copyright Act).  
 69. See id. at 7–8 (requesting a preliminary injunction on the release of the 
film but also awards to compensate Whitmill for his monetary damages). 
 70. See Matthew Belloni, Warner Bros. Settles ‘Hangover II’ Tattoo Lawsuit 
(Exclusive), HOLLYWOOD REP. (June 20, 2011, 1:39 PM), http://www.hollywood 
reporter.com/thr-esq/warner-bros-settles-hangover-ii-203377 (last visited Nov. 6, 
2015) (noting that “Warner’s attorneys must have been concerned that [Judge] 
Perry suggested she saw merit in the case . . . [and] planned to digitally alter 
the tattoo for the home video version of the film if the case didn’t settle quickly”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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Whitmill filed.71 Unlike the court in Reed, however, the judge 
assigned to Whitmill made statements about the law surrounding 
copyright and tattoos during a preliminary hearing.72 The day 
before the case settled outside of court, Judge Perry heard 
arguments on Whitmill’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction to 
prevent Warner Brothers from releasing the film if it contained 
any semblance of his copyrighted work.73 Relying on the 
Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C. L. Systems, Inc.74 factors to 
determine whether to grant a preliminary injunction, Judge 
Perry denied Whitmill’s motion.75  
Before denying Whitmill the preliminary injunction, Judge 
Perry addressed the merits of the case, concluding, “I think 
Plaintiff has a strong likelihood of prevailing on the merits for 
copyright infringement.”76 She continued to comment on the 
merits and criticized Warner Brothers’ various defenses to the 
copyright infringement claim, including Warner Brothers’ 
argument that tattoos were not copyrightable subject matter.77 In 
her strongest statement in favor of Whitmill, Judge Perry stated, 
                                                                                                     
 71. See Warner Brothers Complaint, supra note 15, at 1 (identifying the 
filing date as April 28, 2011); Order of Dismissal at 1, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. 
Entm’t, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-00752 (E.D. Mo. June 22, 2011) (listing the date of 
dismissal with prejudice as June 22, 2011, just two months after the date of 
filing). 
 72. Compare Nike Order of Dismissal, supra note 59, at 1 (settling well in 
advance of trial and never arguing the legal issues before the judge), with 
Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1, Whitmill v. 
Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-00752 (E.D. Mo. June 21, 2011) 
[hereinafter Warner Brothers Hearing] (transcribing a Hearing on Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, during which Judge Perry ruled on several issues 
pertaining to copyright law and tattoos).  
 73. See Warner Brothers Hearing, supra note 72, at 2 (concluding that the 
“balance of equities favor[ed]” Warner Brothers when comparing the harms of a 
preliminary injunction to both parties).  
 74. 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981).  
 75. See Warner Brothers Hearing, supra note 72, at 9 (considering whether 
to grant Whitmill’s preliminary injunction based on the Dataphase factors: 
(1) plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits, (2) whether plaintiff is 
threatened with irreparable harm, (3) the balance of equities, and (4) the public 
interest). “So when I put all the four factors together, I’m going to deny the 
preliminary injunction.” Id.  
 76. Id. at 3.  
 77. See id. (pontificating that Whitmill would win on the merits, perhaps to 
encourage the parties to settle, which they did later that day).  
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“Most of the defendant’s arguments against [copyright 
infringement] are just silly. Of course tattoos can be copyrighted. 
I don’t think there is any reasonable dispute about that.”78 The 
parties settled later that day.79 
C. Allen v. Electronic Arts, Inc. 
This case involved professional football player Ricky 
Williams, his tattoo artist Scott Allen, and video game empire 
Electronic Arts, Inc., also referred to as EA Sports.80 Ricky 
Williams visited Crybabies Tattoo, Allen’s place of business, and 
requested Allen apply a tattoo to his upper arm.81 In his 
Complaint, Allen, like Reed before him, admitted that he knew 
Williams as a professional football player and “assumed he would 
see his art on television.”82 In early 2010, however, Allen saw his 
tattoo art displayed not just during NFL games but also on the 
cover of EA Sports’ games, including NFL Street, Madden NFL 
10, and Madden NFL 11.83 Like Reed, Allen could accept—and 
actually expected—some violations of his exclusive rights, but a 
featured use of a derivative work went too far.84 Allen sued EA 
Sports for violating his exclusive rights and specifically for 
copying, reproducing, distributing, making an unauthorized 
                                                                                                     
 78. Id.  
 79. See ADR Compliance Report at 1, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, 
Inc., No. 4:11-CV-00752 (E.D. Mo. June 21, 2011) (indicating that the parties 
achieved a settlement agreement).  
 80. See Electronic Arts Complaint, supra note 16, at 2 (listing the parties 
as Scott Allen, a tattoo artist at Crybabies Tattoo, Electronic Arts, Inc., a 
manufacturer and seller of video games, and Ricky Williams, an NFL player and 
recipient of a tattoo from Allen). 
 81. See id. (describing the first interaction between Williams and Allen).  
 82. See id. at 3 (admitting that Allen expected to see a public display of his 
work on Williams on television).  
 83. See id. at 3–4 (noting that the plaintiff “became aware” that EA Sports 
displayed and used Williams’s tattoo on multiple video game covers); id. at 
Exhibits 2–3 (depicting the cover of NFL Street, Madden NFL 10, and Madden 
NFL 11, which all included animated replicas of Allen’s tattoo art on Williams’s 
body).  
 84. See id. at 4 (accusing Electronic Arts of copying, reproducing, 
distributing, adapting, and publicly displaying the copyrighted work without 
obtaining consent, permission, or authority from Allen first).  
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derivative work, and publicly displaying the copyrighted work.85 
Allen also sued Williams for contributory infringement of his 
copyright and exclusive rights; in the alternative, he sued 
Williams for an accounting of his share in the profit from any use 
of the tattoo as a co-owner of the work.86 
Allen’s Complaint against EA Sports and Williams appears 
eerily similar to Reed’s Complaint against Nike and Wallace—
both artists sued a company for use of the copyrighted work in an 
advertisement, while also suing the recipient of the tattoo for 
either contributing to the advertisement’s infringement or for 
failing to share profits from their use of the copyrighted work.87 
Like Reed’s suit against Nike and Wallace, Allen ultimately 
entered into a settlement agreement with EA Sports and 
Williams, just three and a half months after filing his 
complaint.88 
D. What the Cases Mean 
Most tattoo artists agree that “turning to the courts for 
copyright protection would simply not be worth it” because a 
lawsuit would take too long, cost too much, and distract the artist 
from his or her work.89 Additionally, a lawsuit poses a lot of 
                                                                                                     
 85. See id. at 5 (citing Copyright Act §§ 106 and 501 as Allen’s causes of 
action against Electronic Arts).  
 86. See id. at 6, 9 (describing Allen’s claims against Williams).  
 87. Compare Nike Complaint, supra note 14 (suing Nike for featuring the 
tattoo in a commercial and suing Wallace for contributing to Nike’s 
infringement or for failing to share profits from the use of the tattoo), with 
Electronic Arts Complaint, supra note 16 (suing EA Sports for featuring the 
tattoo on the cover of three video games and suing Williams for contributing to 
EA Sports’ infringement or for failing to share profits from the use of the tattoo).  
 88. See Order at 1, Allen v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-03172 (W.D. La. 
Apr. 9, 2013) (dismissing the case after plaintiff’s motion to do so).  
 89. See Matthew Beasley, Note, Who Owns Your Skin: Intellectual Property 
Law and Norms Among Tattoo Artists, 85 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1137, 1158 (2012) 
(interviewing tattoo artists to discuss the effectiveness of intellectual property 
law and its relation to protecting their rights). Most tattoo artists expressed 
mixed feelings and ignorance regarding lawsuits for unauthorized copying of 
their artwork, indicating that direct confrontation of other infringing artists 
occurred more often than resorting to the legal system. See id. (relating tattoo 
artists’ reluctance to file lawsuits against one another and their preference to 
handle matters on their own).  
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ambiguity and uncertainty for a plaintiff tattoo artist because to 
date, “no cases concerning the copyrightability of tattoos have 
gone to trial.”90 The fact that all three major cases settled 
indicates at least some fear on the part of the defendants that 
tattoo artists have legitimate copyright infringement claims, and 
Judge Perry’s oral pontificating in the Whitmill case seems to 
support that same conclusion.91 Alternatively, all the defendants 
wanted to avoid the nuisance of ongoing litigation and the bad 
publicity associated with a trial, recognized litigation as a cost of 
doing business, and could afford to throw settlement money at 
their copyright problems without any negative effect on their 
businesses; their settlements do not necessarily demonstrate the 
validity of the artists’ claims.92 Without a trial and a subsequent 
holding, however, the case law surrounding this topic remains 
unpersuasive. 
IV. The Scholarship’s Alternatives: Failed Proposals to Protect the 
Interests of Artists, Industries, and Clients  
A. Fair Use 
In asserting their affirmative defenses to the tattoo artists’ 
claims of copyright infringement, both Nike and Warner Brothers 
claimed that their uses of the tattoos constituted fair uses of the 
copyrighted works.93 Section 107 of the Copyright Act first 
                                                                                                     
 90. See King, supra note 11, at 129–30 (2013) (addressing the “ambiguity 
regarding the legal protectability of tattoos and the negative impact such 
ambiguity has on the rights of tattoo artists and their clients/customers”).  
 91. See Warner Brothers Hearing, supra note 72, at 3 (indicating that 
Judge Perry believed Whitmill would win on the merits in his copyright 
infringement suit against Warner Brothers). 
 92. See Timothy C. Bradley, The Copyright Implications of Tattoos: Why 
Getting Inked Can Get You into Court, 29 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 31 (2011) 
(“[D]isputes will continue to settle before trial, considering that the disputed 
uses . . . have much at stake, and the incentive to settle quickly is high.”); see, 
e.g., Belloni, supra note 70 (highlighting Warner Brothers’ interest in settling 
the lawsuit because litigation continued “just days before the film was scheduled 
to be released,” threatening to damage Warner Brothers’ financial interests in 
the film).  
 93. See Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint 
at 6, Reed v. Nike, Inc., No. 3:05-CV-00198 (D. Or. Apr. 14, 2005) [hereinafter 
Nike Answer] (“Defendants’ alleged conduct constitutes fair use.”); Bradley, 
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identifies six uses within the scope of the fair use doctrine: 
“criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple 
copies for classroom use), scholarship or research.”94 The Act goes 
on to outline the factors to consider in a fair use analysis, which 
include: (1) the purpose and character of the use, such as 
commercial versus nonprofit use of the work; (2) the nature of the 
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market or value of the 
copyrighted work.95 Other authorities have described the defense 
of fair use as “a privilege in others than the owner of a copyright 
to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without 
his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner 
by the copyright.”96 The authorities agree that Congress, when 
                                                                                                     
supra note 92, at 30 (discussing Warner Brothers’ assertion of the affirmative 
defense of fair use).  
 94. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (listing categories of 
works that generally meet the fair use test, a defense to copyright 
infringement). 
 95. See id. (identifying factors to aid in determining whether the use of a 
work qualifies as fair). This Note primarily focuses on the first factor, the 
purpose and character of the use, because of the lack of dispute surrounding the 
other three factors for the fair use of copyrighted tattoos. Most copyrighted 
tattoos inherently possess some creativity, which limits the fair use defense. See 
ALBERT & AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, supra note 55, at 197 (“Thus a 
broader fair use approach applies to works that are information or that stress 
utility over creativity.”). Madden NFL’s copying of the work appropriates the 
entirety of the tattoo, not a minimal portion of the work. See id. at 198 
(“Appropriation of an entire work is often sufficient to preclude a fair use 
defense.”). Finally, widespread copying and display of the copyrighted work 
would undoubtedly have a substantial impact on the artists’ market. See id. at 
199 (noting the importance of the fourth fair use factor and emphasizing that a 
substantial market impact forecloses fair use as a defense); Am. Geophysical 
Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 926–31 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that the fourth 
factor favored the publishers who sued for copyright infringement, despite 
evidence of limited effect on the potential market for the copyrighted works). 
But see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) (refusing to 
focus on the fourth factor as the most prudent and imploring courts to avoid 
treating the fourth factor in isolation, ultimately demanding a weighing test of 
all four).  
 96. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 36, § 10:1 (2d ed. 2004) (enhancing the 
definition of fair use to include “an equitable rule of reason” and a use “allowed 
as reasonable and customary on the theory that the author must have foreseen 
it and tacitly consented to it”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976) 
(illustrating the intended breadth of § 107 with a variety of examples, including 
quotations of excerpts in a review, quotations in scholarly works, parody, 
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creating the equitable fair use defense, aimed to confirm the Act’s 
basic goal of putting copyrighted works to their most beneficial 
uses for the good of the public.97  
Congress and the courts rely on two overlapping approaches 
to the fair use defense: a private benefit approach and a public 
benefit approach.98 The primary distinction between the two 
approaches exists in the first factor of the Act: commercial use 
versus copying for nonprofit use.99 Initially, courts found that any 
commercial use created a presumption of unfairness because “the 
user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material 
without paying the customary price.”100 A commercial use 
infringer can rebut the presumption of unfairness by 
demonstrating certain characteristics of a particular commercial 
use, as the defendant did in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, 
Inc.101 In Sega, the defendant copied the plaintiff’s copyrighted 
software for purposes of reverse engineering it to create its own 
competing software.102 Although the defendant’s ultimate 
purpose was commercial, its direct purpose was not, and the 
court found that the defendant had a legitimate interest in 
studying certain aspects of the plaintiff’s software, and that the 
                                                                                                     
reproductions in libraries to replace part of a damaged copy, and copying a work 
in legislative or judicial proceedings).  
 97. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 36, § 10:1 (2d ed. 2004) (noting that the 
fair use defense does not contradict copyright law’s basic goal of harmonizing 
the claims of individual creators with the benefits to the public). 
 98. See id. (identifying the two primary theories that separate fair use 
analyses, which emphasize the importance of the first factor for fair use set 
forth in the Act).  
 99. See id. (“Congress and the courts have reconciled the public good with 
the claims of individuals through two, overlapping, approaches to the fair use 
defense.”); ALBERT & AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, supra note 55, at 190 
(conflating Goldstein’s bifurcated approach to the fair use defense with the 
distinction that relies on the question of commercial use).  
 100. See ALBERT & AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, supra note 55, at 190 
(identifying the inherent unfairness of profiting from another’s copyrighted 
work); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1558 (M.D. Fla. 1993) 
(holding that any commercial use creates a “meaningful likelihood that future 
market harm exists,” regardless of the presence or absence of the other factors).  
 101. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir. 
1992) (“However, the presumption of unfairness that arises in such cases can be 
rebutted by the characteristics of a particular commercial use.”).  
 102. See id. at 1523 (describing the defendant’s actions that infringed on 
plaintiff’s copyrighted work).  
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defendant’s purpose served the public by disseminating 
unprotected ideas.103  
The Ninth Circuit expanded the bounds of the fair use 
defense in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,104 when it found a search 
engine’s copying of thumbnail versions of copyrighted images for 
purposes of indexing a fair use.105 Ultimately, the court 
characterized the defendant search engine’s use as a 
“transformative use” because the purpose “of the thumbnail 
images was to provide an index, which greatly differed from the 
aesthetic purpose of the images.”106 Fair use requires that the 
subsequent presentation and use transform the original 
copyrighted work and serve some alternative purpose from the 
original, as Kelly and later cases such as Perfect 10 v. 
Amazon.com, Inc.107 emphasized.108 
Despite courts’ continual development of the fair use defense, 
video games, broadcasts, and players cannot successfully assert it 
to defend their copying and displays of copyrighted tattoos.109 
This defense primarily fails due to the emphasis courts place on 
the commercial versus nonprofit use factor.110 Clearly, players, 
                                                                                                     
 103. See id. (holding that the defendant copied “for a legitimate, essentially 
non-exploitative purpose, and that the commercial aspect of its use can best be 
described as of minimal significance”).  
 104. 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).  
 105. See id. at 821 (finding that Arriba’s reproduction of Kelly’s images for 
use as thumbnails in Arriba’s search engine constituted a fair use).  
 106. See id. at 822 (describing the differences between the defendant’s 
transformative use and the artist’s original purpose for the copyrighted images 
then turned into thumbnails).  
 107. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). In this case, the court upheld the validity 
of Google Images’ cataloging and framing of Perfect 10’s copyrighted images 
because Google’s use and purpose both qualified as transformative. See id. at 
1168 (“Google has put Perfect 10’s thumbnail images (along with millions of 
other thumbnail images) to a use fundamentally different than the use intended 
by Perfect 10. In doing so, Google has provided a significant benefit to the 
public.”).  
 108. See ALBERT & AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, supra note 55, at 193 
(“As can be seen, fair use requires that the presentation and use be 
transformative and not simply a verbatim copy that serves the same purpose as 
the original.”). 
 109. See, e.g., Warner Brothers Hearing, supra note 72, at 4 (commenting  
on the “likelihood of success on the merits analysis of the fair use” defense and 
doubting its success in such a distinctly commercial case).  
 110. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text (describing the 
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video games, and other related industries profit significantly from 
the copyright infringements associated with their businesses, and 
none of the parties at fault can point to a transformative purpose 
for their uses of the copyrighted work.111 Although the 
scholarship presents fair use as a legitimate solution to the 
problem of copyright and tattoos, it fails in the situation 
presented by Madden NFL and professional athletes’ careers, 
which both profit substantially from their infringing activities. 
B. Work Made for Hire 
The work for hire doctrine presents an alternative possibility 
to resolve artist and client disputes for commissioned tattoos.112 A 
work for hire “is a work prepared by an employee within the 
scope of his or her employment, or a work specially ordered or 
commissioned to fit within a list of nine categories that treat the 
tattooer as an independent contractor.”113 As tattoos do not 
                                                                                                     
importance of the first factor for fair use analysis in the Copyright Act as 
between commercial and not-for-profit uses of a copyrighted work).  
 111. See Warner Brothers Hearing, supra note 72, at 3 (doubting the 
effectiveness of Warner Brothers’ fair use defense for lack of transforming or 
parodying the Tyson tattoo in some way, and for the plain fact that Warner 
Brothers stood to profit heavily from the film). Additionally, the fair use doctrine 
primarily defends against a single use of a copyrighted work, not multiple 
infringing uses. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417, 465 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (referencing a Senate report 
accompanying the Copyright Act of 1976 as preferring single copies and not 
multiple copies when attempting to assert fair use as a defense). 
 112. See Meredith Hatic, Who Owns Your Body Art?: The Copyright and 
Constitutional Implications of Tattoos, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 396, 429 (2012) (admitting that using the work-for-hire exception in the 
Copyright Act to protect tattoo artists and clients is “a bit of a stretch”).  
 113. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, § 5.03 (“The employer or other 
person for whom the for-hire work was prepared is considered the author for 
copyright purposes.”); Nickow, supra note 13, at 204 (defining a work for hire in 
the tattoo context); see also Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012) 
(describing that in the case of a “work made for hire, the employer or other 
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of 
this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written 
instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright”). 
The nine categories for commissioned works that treat the artist as an 
independent contractor include works  
specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a 
collective work, as a part of a motion picture . . . as a translation, as a 
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satisfy the terms of § 101 of the Act for a work made for hire by 
an independent contractor, this Note only examines the work 
made for hire doctrine as it relates to employees working within 
the scope of employment.114 The statute takes a restrictive 
approach to the work made for hire doctrine, so if the artist–
client relationship does not fall within the Act’s narrow definition 
of a work made for hire, the client owns the tattoo only if the 
artist expressly assigns his or her ownership rights to the 
client.115 Therefore, “[e]ven if the client is contracting with a 
vendor for materials that will be developed expressly for the 
client and at the client’s expense, the client will not own the 
materials.”116 The tattoo artist would be the employee of the 
tattoo recipient, and the tattoo on the recipient would be the work 
made for hire.  
In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,117 the Court 
interpreted Congress’s use of “employee” and “employment” in 
the Copyright Act to include only the terms’ settled and common 
law definitions, limiting the scope of the terms to the 
conventional relation of employer and employee.118 Reid 
mandated reliance on common law agency doctrine in the absence 
of a formal employment agreement, which considers the hiring 
party’s right to control the manner and means by which the 
employee creates the product.119  
                                                                                                     
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instruction text, as a 
test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties 
expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work 
shall be considered a work made for hire. 
Id. § 101. 
 114. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (limiting the work made for hire defense for 
independent contractors to nine specific categories, none of which include 
pictorial or graphic works).  
 115. See Cathy Kiselyak Austin, U.S. Copyright Act—“Work Made For Hire” 
Doctrine, in UNDERSTANDING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSE 609, 611 
(2004) (“If the deliverables do not fall with[in] the statute’s narrow definition of 
‘works made for hire,’ the client can own them only if the vendor explicitly 
assigns its ownership rights to the client.”). 
 116. Id. 
 117. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).  
 118. See id. at 731 (considering the meaning of “employee” and 
“employment” as used in the Copyright Act to determine if a work qualified as a 
work made for hire).  
 119. See id. at 752 (“To determine whether a work is a ‘work made for hire’ 
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The Court then listed other relevant factors to decide if a 
work qualifies as a work made for hire: the skill required by the 
employee; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the 
location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the 
employee and the hiring party; the method of payment; the 
business of the hiring party; the provision of employee benefits; 
and the tax treatment of the employee.120 Like Reid, the sculptor 
in the case, tattoo artists clearly are not employees of their clients 
but are independent contractors.121  
The Court determined that sculpting was a skilled 
occupation, that Reid supplied his own tools, that he worked in 
his own studio and only for Community for Creative Non-Violence 
(CCNV) for a short period of time, that his payment depended on 
his completion of a specific job, and that CCNV did not owe 
payroll or Social Security taxes or provide any employee benefits 
to Reid.122 With a plethora of factors to support its holding, the 
Court definitively labeled Reid an independent contractor, and 
because sculptures (like tattoos) fall outside the nine categories in 
§ 101, the work in question was not a work made for hire.123 The 
similarities between tattoos created for clients and the sculptural 
work that Reid produced for CCNV are striking and thereby 
eliminate the work made for hire doctrine as a legitimate defense 
                                                                                                     
within the § 101 definition, a court should first apply general common law of 
agency principles to ascertain whether the work was prepared by an employee 
or an independent contractor . . . .”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§ 1 (1958) (defining an agency relationship and emphasizing that an agency 
relationship does not require intent to create an agency relationship); 1 NIMMER 
& NIMMER, supra note 38, § 5.03[B][1][a][iii] (observing the similarity between 
the Court’s adopted agency test (the right to control the product) and the tests 
the Court rejected (the hiring party retains the right or actually wields the right 
to control the product)).  
 120. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752 (1989) 
(exhausting a list of other factors in the work made for hire analysis).  
 121. See id. (labeling Reid as an independent contractor, not an employee of 
Community for Creative Non-Violence).  
 122. See id. at 753 (applying the list of factors from § 220(2) of the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY to Reid and determining his status as an 
independent contractor and not an employee).  
 123. See id. (noting that the CCNV conceded that the sculptural work could 
not satisfy the terms of § 101, eliminating the possibility that the sculpture was 
a work made for hire). 
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for professional athletes, video games, and other displayers of a 
copyrighted tattoo.124 
C. Joint Authorship 
For some clients, such as Wallace, the authorities suggest 
joint authorship as a defense.125 The Copyright Act specifically 
addresses works that result from the effort of multiple authors, 
stating that “[t]he authors of a joint work are co-owners of 
copyright in the work.”126 Section 101 of the Act defines a joint 
work as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the 
intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or 
interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”127 In his famed treatise, 
renowned copyright scholar Melville Nimmer describes some 
examples that illustrate the concept of joint works: products of 
joint authorship, works for which the author transfers copyright 
to more than one person, a copyrighted work that passes via 
intestacy or will of the author, a work that gives the renewal 
rights to a class consisting of more than one person, or a work 
subject to community property laws in certain states.128  
Nimmer recognizes the limitations of categorizing joint works 
and products of joint authorship and instead explains the concept 
as a product of two distinctive theories: inseparability, which 
occurs when each author cannot separately identify his or her 
                                                                                                     
 124. See Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. 511, 534 
(2013) (“Custom tattoos are almost certainly not works made for hire as defined 
by the Copyright Act.”). Cf. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, 
§ 5.03[B][1][a][iv] (suggesting a return to the formalist position that only formal, 
salaried employees qualify under the work for hire doctrine, despite the Court’s 
analysis in Reid).  
 125. See Nike Answer, supra note 93, at 6 (asserting joint authorship as a 
defense to Reed’s infringement allegations because of Wallace’s participation in 
the creative process). 
 126. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012) (defining a joint 
work).  
 127. See id. § 101 (emphasizing the requirement of intent to qualify as a 
joint work).  
 128. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, § 6.01 (describing the 
circumstances that result in a joint work with multiple owners of a copyright). 
“A joint work may more properly be defined as one in which the copyright is 
owned in undivided shares by two or more persons.” Id.  
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contributions, and interdependency, where the authors’ 
contributions become an indivisible whole pursuant to an implied 
agreement between them.129 Intent remains a touchstone for joint 
works of joint authors—the parties must intend to create a 
unitary, whole product.130 If joint authors possess the requisite 
intent to create a joint work, the authors can contribute 
unequally to the ultimate product but still possess equal rights in 
the product’s copyright.131 To fall within the Act’s definition of an 
author, however, a joint author must supply intellectuality to the 
project—the law requires more than physical labor.132 
Rasheed Wallace asserted joint authorship as an affirmative 
defense.133 Recall that Wallace proposed the initial concept for his 
tattoo, including the Egyptian theme and characters, but Reed 
created the sketch and flash design for the tattoo before its 
application on Wallace’s arm.134 This give and take of ideas and 
                                                                                                     
 129. See id. § 6.02 (noting the two justifications for the principle of joint 
authorship as works with inseparable contributions by each author and works 
where the respective contributions depend on each other to produce an 
indivisibly whole product); see also Brown v. McCormick, 23 F. Supp. 2d 594, 
605 (D. Md. 1998) (illustrating interdependency when presuming that the 
lyricist and composer of a song, despite contributing separately identifiable 
elements of the final product, intended that each have an undivided interest in 
the combined product of their respective efforts).  
 130. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, § 6.03 (describing how the 
authors must have “the intention that their contributions be merged . . . at the 
moment in time when the work is created, not some later date”). But see Edward 
B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 268, 270 (2d Cir. 1944) 
(holding that joint authorship requires each author to intend that his 
contribution constitute a part of a total work at the time he creates it, not that 
both authors have the same intention at the same time).  
 131. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, § 6.07[A][1] (noting that equal 
contributions are not required, but more than a de minimis contribution is 
required to create a joint work).  
 132. See id. § 6.07[A][2] (“Further, the contribution must be one of 
authorship in order to constitute the contributor a joint author.”); Kyjen Co. v. 
Vo-Toys, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1068 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (defining what acts 
an author must perform to qualify as an author for purposes of determining 
joint work status).  
 133. See Nike Answer, supra note 93, at 6 (“Defendant Wallace is the sole 
owner, or alternatively a joint author, of the work.”). 
 134. Compare Nike Complaint, supra note 14, at 3 (describing the 
interactions and exchanging of ideas between Wallace and Reed before Reed 
inking the final tattoo on Wallace’s arm), with Nike Answer, supra note 93, at 3 
(admitting that Wallace met with Reed to discuss the design of his tattoo but 
indicating that Reed aided in the design process and solely applied the final 
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design suggestions remains commonplace in the custom tattoo 
world, creating the appearance of joint authorship between the 
client and the tattooist.135 The heavy emphasis on intent to create 
a joint work between authors, however, undermines this 
defense.136 Tattoo artists’ clients do not typically intend to create 
a joint work and more frequently rely on the artists’ expertise to 
create a final, copyrightable product.137 Generally, a client’s 
minimal contribution at the beginning of the creative process, 
including his or her suggestion of ideas or provision of 
photographs or inspiration, falls under the de minimis exception 
for joint works, precluding the client from claiming any 
authorship in the final product.138 
D. Implied Nonexclusive License 
An implied license protects a client from an artist’s claim of 
copyright infringement for simply appearing in public.139 
                                                                                                     
tattoo).  
 135. See Guen Douglas, The Process of Getting a Custom Tattoo, TATTOO 
ARTIST MAG. (Sept. 22, 2011), http://tattooartistmagazineblog.com/2011/09/22/ 
guen-douglas-tattoos-process-of-getting-a-custom-tattoo-artist-magazine-blog/ 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (noting that most tattoo artists draw and sketch 
designs after the initial consultation but do not charge the client for this service) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 136. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, § 6.03 (recognizing intent as 
the touchstone of the joint work doctrine).  
 137. See Douglas, supra note 135 (describing how clients generally “like to 
give their artist freedom to explore a subject”); Perzanowski, supra note 124, at 
533 (“Because of their greater familiarity with theories of design and 
composition, as well as a clearer understanding of the limitations of the 
medium, tattooers frequently guide their clients toward choices that, while true 
to the client’s original conception, are more likely to translate well into 
tattoos.”).  
 138. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, § 6.07[A][1] (discussing de 
minimis contributions as preventing a contributor from claiming joint 
authorship of a work); Perzanowski, supra note 124, at 535 (pointing out that 
“the contributions of most clients are unlikely to meet the threshold of 
authorship” for the joint authorship defense to succeed in the tattoo context).  
 139. See Hatic, supra note 112, at 432 (“If a subject has a nonexclusive 
license to display his tattoo, he has an affirmative defense to a claim of 
copyright infringement by the artist/owner.”). For example, if a tattoo artist 
obtains an implied license for another artist’s flash, the artist with the license 
can copy the design for purposes of transferring it to a client’s skin. See 
Perzanowski, supra note 124, at 560 (discussing the widely accepted practice of 
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Exclusive licenses and other transfers of copyright ownership 
must occur in writing, and the owner of the rights conveyed must 
sign the document.140 An artist can grant or imply a nonexclusive 
license by spoken word or even mere conduct.141 An implied 
nonexclusive license does not transfer any ownership interest in 
the copyrighted work to the licensee but allows the licensee to use 
the work in ways specified by the licensor.142  
Scholars praise courts that choose to recognize implied 
nonexclusive licenses but tend to limit their theory to 
noncommercial displays of the copyrighted work.143 As previously 
discussed,144 the highly commercial nature of professional 
athletes’ careers and most related activities excludes the 
possibility of an implied nonexclusive license serving as a valid 
defense in copyright infringement cases against them.145 
                                                                                                     
implied licenses and flash designs). The artist that acquires the license may not, 
however, copy it for other purposes, such as printing t-shirts or creating 
competing sheets of flash to sell. See id. (noting that these actions would exceed 
the scope of the implied license and also violate industry norms regarding flash).  
 140. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2012) (requiring certain 
formalities for the instrument of a conveyance in ownership of a copyrighted 
work); see also 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, § 10.03[A][1][a] (listing the 
cumulative aspects required to successfully convey ownership or rights in a 
copyright to another in writing).  
 141. See Hatic, supra note 112, at 431 (“However, nonexclusive licenses may 
be granted orally or may be implied from conduct.”).  
 142. See id. at 432 (“If a subject has a nonexclusive license to display his 
tattoo, he has an affirmative defense to a claim of copyright infringement by the 
artist/owner.”).  
 143. See id. at 431 (identifying courts that created elements for finding a 
nonexclusive implied license). The elements relied on by some courts include: 
(1) the purported licensee requests the creation of the work, (2) the copyright 
owner creates the work and delivers it to the licensee, and (3) the copyright 
owner intends the licensee to use the work as the licensee does. See Hevia v. 
Portrio Corp., 602 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2010) (identifying factors that strongly 
suggest the finding of an implied nonexclusive license, although declining to 
recognize such a license in the case at hand).  
 144. See supra notes 110–111 and accompanying text (highlighting that the 
extremely commercial nature of all uses of a copyrighted tattoo prevent clients 
and industries from relying on the fair use defense).  
 145. See Verified Answer to Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Other 
Relief at 8, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-00752 (E.D. Mo. 
May 20, 2011) (claiming that “Warner Bros. ha[d] an implied license from 
plaintiff to use Mr. Tyson’s tattoo in The Hangover: Part II”). Judge Perry 
doubted the validity of claiming a nonexclusive implied license as a defense, too. 
See Warner Brothers Hearing, supra note 72, at 4 (“[T]here is no evidence at all 
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Additionally, because an artist can revoke the implied license at 
any point and due to the limited scope of such license, this 
solution remains less than ideal for clients and the video game 
industry.146 
E. The National Football League Players Association’s Advice to 
Players 
In response to the uncertainty surrounding the 
aforementioned defenses, the NFLPA stepped into the role of 
proactive legal advisor for its members.147 During the NFL 
Combine, a training camp for potential professional football 
players, the Association correctly proposed the most ideal 
solution.148 It “advised agents to tell their players that when they 
get tattoos going forward, they should get a release from the 
tattoo artist, and if they can track down their former artists, they 
should get a release” from them as well.149 Failing to obtain 
                                                                                                     
that Warner Brothers had any kind of license implied or otherwise to use the 
tattoo, and so Warner Brothers’ use of the tattoo was unauthorized . . . .”).  
 146. See Craig P. Bloom, Note, Hangover Effect: May I See Your Tattoo, 
Please, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 435, 470 (2013) (“An implied license is 
generally revocable by the copyright owner.”); Perzanowski, supra note 124, at 
560 (highlighting the failures of the implied license as a protection due to its 
limited scope). 
 147. See Heitner & Wilmot, supra note 6, at 322 (“NFLPA officials started 
advising players to get copyright waivers or licenses from their tattoo artists as 
a result of Stephen Allen’s lawsuit against EA Sports and former NFL running 
back Ricky Williams for use of a tattoo on NFL Street video game covers.”); 
Darren Heitner, Questions Concerning Copyright of Athlete Tattoos Has 
Companies Scrambling, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2013, 8:01 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2013/08/14/questions-concerning-
copyright-of-athlete-tattoos-has-companies-scrambling/ (last visited Nov. 6, 
2015) (noting the appreciation of players towards the NFLPA for warning them 
about their potential liability but insisting that the NFLPA “should have been 
on top of it earlier”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 148. See Heitner, supra note 147 (discussing the various suggestions the 
NFLPA makes to new players at the NFL Combine to prevent tattoo issues from 
surfacing in the future for players, teams, sponsors, and other industry 
participants).  
 149. Id.; see also Bradley, supra note 92, at 31 (“Encourage both tattoo 
artists and tattoo recipients to sign copyright agreements outlining the relative 
transfer or retention of tattoo intellectual property rights.”); Heitner & Wilmot, 
supra note 6, at 320 (urging athletes to seek a transfer of right in the copyright 
prior to the ink drying but recognizing that this transfer might cause artists to 
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releases from tattoo artists may result in the NFLPA requiring a 
player to indemnify the NFLPA and its associated companies 
from any and all claims made by the player’s tattoo artists.150 The 
NFLPA, however, recognizes that forcing players to obtain signed 
releases every time they want a new tattoo remains wildly 
unrealistic and therefore requires an alternative.151 
V. A Better Solution: The Featured Use Test 
A. Reiterating the Problem: Valid yet Competing Interests 
Clearly, the competing and contradicting rights of the player, 
the artist, and the video game pose serious dilemmas for the 
development of copyright law in this arena.152 Players possess 
their own rights of publicity, which include the ability to choose 
where they make appearances and which media outlets they 
allow to use their likenesses.153 Tattoo artists, like other authors 
of creative, pictorial, and graphic works, lawfully deserve some 
                                                                                                     
charge additional fees).   
 150. See Heitner, supra note 147 (describing the NFLPA’s lucrative group 
licensing program that requires heavy legal protection from copyright lawsuits, 
including lawsuits from players’ tattoo artists).  
 151. See id. (hinting that the NFLPA’s attempt to reduce its exposure 
depends on the players carrying the NFLPA’s plan through); Bradley, supra 
note 92, at 31 (suggesting that lawyers who represent celebrities and 
professional athletes should encourage their clients to consult with them before 
getting tattooed, despite the unrealistic nature of this practice pointer).  
 152.  See King, supra note 11, at 130 (identifying a “handful of other 
copyright lawsuits [that] have shed some light on how the courts might analyze 
the unique issues that arise in the determination of copyrightability of tattoos 
and the problems that flow from providing copyright protection to these creative 
works”); Perzanowski, supra note 124, at 530 (recognizing the “parade of 
horribles” associated with tattoo artists actually obtaining exclusive rights 
under the Copyright Act as alarming but suggesting that tattoo industry norms 
and practices resolve the problem); Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 7 (asking 
if artists should have the right to order their clients to stay off a movie set and 
deciding that, although copyright law gives that power to an artist, “no court 
would or should allow it”). 
 153. See Garrett Rice, Note, Groove is in the Hart: A Workable Solution for 
Applying the Right of Publicity to Video Games, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 317, 
323–35 (2015) (differentiating between the right of publicity and the right to 
privacy and emphasizing that the right to publicity “guards an individual’s right 
to profit from his own identity,” prohibiting others from exploiting his or her 
identity without consent).  
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degree of protection for their designs from the Copyright Act.154 
The video game industry maintains an interest in continuing to 
enhance the realism in its games, which apparently increases the 
profitability and popularity of games.155 While all these rights 
appear valid, they cannot coexist without imposing on one 
another.156 As discussed in Part IV, other authorities attempt to 
cobble together solutions that only pose further problems for one 
party or another, thus paving the way for the acceptance of a 
novel proposal before the ink dries on this pressing issue.157 
B. When All Else Fails  
1. The Policy Position: Prioritizing Personal Dignity over 
Protection for Artists 
As a testament to this country’s longstanding commitment to 
personal autonomy, tattoo artists still should not receive any 
copyright protection for nonfeatured uses of their inked art, even 
when players inevitably fail to obtain the necessary 
documentation suggested by the NFLPA.158 Although most 
                                                                                                     
 154. See Warner Brothers Hearing, supra note 72, at 3 (“Of course tattoos 
can be copyrighted. I don’t think there is any reasonable dispute about that.”). 
But see Perzanowski, supra note 124, at 537 (interpreting tattoo artists’ norms 
to “embrace a more robust set of exhaustion rights favoring their clients” 
instead of themselves).  
 155. See Cheryl Walker, Video Games and Realism: Communication 
Professor Studies Effects on Children, WAKE FOREST UNIV. (Dec. 22, 2010), 
http://news.wfu.edu/2010/12/22/video-games-and-realism/ (last visited Nov. 6, 
2015) (noting that “with these games, the enhanced realism also makes the 
player feel more involved in the game and increases the effect” of actual 
involvement, which continues as a popular trait of video games) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 156. See King, supra note 11, at 161 (encouraging artists to enforce their 
rights but ignoring the rights of the “younger generation,” which acquires more 
tattoos than any other before it).  
 157. See supra Part IV (outlining the variety of suggestions that scholars 
created to solve the tattoo and copyright dilemma and pointing out each theory’s 
weak spot as it related to the player, the artist, or the video game).  
 158. See IOANNIS G. DIMITRAKOPOULOS, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 
UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: THE CASE LAW OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 331 
(2007) (recognizing that certain matters involving the most intimate and 
personal choices a person may make obtain constitutional recognition through 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments). The author goes further by identifying 
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scholars and lawyers quickly agree that tattoos deserve copyright 
protection, they also recognize that the “potential for an artist to 
control a person’s public appearances and activities is all too 
harmful to the ideals of individual autonomy and freedom.”159 
Without a harsh deviation from previously suggested solutions, 
“[c]opyright law thereby becomes the instrument to impose, 
almost literally, a badge of involuntary servitude, akin to the 
mark which ranchers brand the cattle they own” onto the 
recipient of a tattoo.160 Withholding tattoo artists’ copyright 
protection for nonfeatured uses of their works only occurs if a 
client cannot successfully rely on other defenses and if the client 
failed to obtain a release prior to getting inked.  
Nimmer recently voiced his support of this conclusion in a 
memorandum he wrote for Warner Brothers in Whitmill, 
admitting that he “tacitly assumed that a tattoo could 
‘presumably qualify as a work of graphic art’” before taking the 
case.161 His memorandum, however, depicts a drastic departure 
from his previously held beliefs.162 To illustrate this shift, 
Nimmer used the example of Mike Tyson’s face tattoo to 
demonstrate the absurdity of granting Whitmill exclusive rights 
under the Act for the copyrighted work: 
[T]he consequences of recognizing copyright protection for a 
tattoo include the possibility that a court could order the 
bearer not to remove it, if it has gained recognized stature; or 
to order the bearer to undergo laser removal, if he has added 
an additional tattoo adjacent to it; or to prevent magazine, 
television, and film coverage of the bearer with the tattoo on 
                                                                                                     
privacy and personal autonomy over one’s self as “the most comprehensive of 
rights and the right[s] most valued by civilized men.” Id. at 333; see also 
Perzanowski, supra note 124, at 532 (recognizing that without tattooers’ respect 
for client autonomy, clients legally have little protection against the artist). 
 159. See Cummings, supra note 27, at 309 (arguing first for the 
copyrightability of tattoos and then addressing display rights and control over 
the client as separate issues).  
 160. Heitner & Wilmot, supra note 6, at 315.  
 161. See Nimmer Declaration, supra note 32, at 2, 4 (submitting a statement 
on behalf of Warner Brothers discussing his changed views on tattoos and their 
copyrightability). 
 162. See id. at 4 (changing his position regarding the copyrightability of 
tattoos).  
1980 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1947 (2015) 
his face. Further . . . there is no possible way for the bearer of 
the tattoo to protect herself against those consequences.163 
Clearly, the interest in protecting intellectual property rights 
cannot outweigh the immense authority favoring the bearer’s 
personal autonomy, as Nimmer suggested in support of Warner 
Brothers.164 
2. Considerations When Crafting a New Test 
A new, workable test for copyright infringement and tattoos 
must include considerations and components that correct the 
current suggestions’ weaknesses.165 First, the test must apply 
specifically to the tattoo context, recognizing the competing rights 
of artists and clients, as well as the real life ramifications 
associated with getting a tattoo.166 Second, courts must possess 
the ability to consistently apply the new test to give artists, 
clients, and video games a clearer standard to rely on in the 
future.167 Finally, the new test must encompass the video game 
                                                                                                     
 163. Id. at 13. 
 164. See id. at 8 (“For all these reasons, human flesh cannot serve as the 
‘medium of expression’ that Congress intended to embody legally protectable 
authorship. For that reason, plaintiff’s claim of copyright over a tattoo on Mike 
Tyson’s body must be summarily rejected.”).  
 165. See supra Part III (criticizing all the authorities’ suggestions for 
resolution of the issue of tattoos and copyright). Notice that the authorities all 
rely on exceptions to the exclusive rights of the artist instead of recognizing the 
equal importance of the separate and distinct rights of the client. See id. (listing 
fair use, joint works, work made for hire, and implied nonexclusive licenses as 
the proposed solutions for copyright disputes between clients and artists, all of 
which carve back at the artists’ exclusive rights but refuse to identify clients’ 
rights).  
 166. See David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and 
Originality, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 29 (2001) (recognizing the conundrum of the 
copyrightability of someone’s body but struggling to provide evidence to support 
the claim, and instead stating “apodictically that a body, even as augmented, 
simply is not subject to copyright protection”).  
 167. See King, supra note 11, at 133 (aiming to “address the ambiguity 
regarding the protectability of tattoos due to the lack of published court 
decisions in this area of the law, and [identifying] the negative impact such 
ambiguity has on the tattoo industry”); Symposium, International Summit on 
the Law and Business of Video Games: Legal Threats to Game Developers, 16 
SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 99, 115 (2013) (capturing the response of the senior 
director of intellectual property at EA Sports to a question regarding copyright 
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industry while also having wider applications for tattoos in 
general.168 
3. The Featured Use Test 
In prioritizing players’ rights to live their lives without the 
concern of copyright infringement lawsuits, artists’ rights cannot 
disappear altogether.169 This Note proposes a new test to 
determine which uses of artists’ copyrighted works garner legal 
protection. The featured use test depends upon the nature of the 
allegedly infringing activity; if use of the artist’s tattoo qualifies 
as featured, the violating parties cannot disclaim liability.170  
The featured use test dictates that incidental, nonfeatured 
uses of a tattoo will not violate the artist’s rights, but when a 
party consciously chooses to feature an artist’s tattoo in a place of 
prominence, the party’s use triggers the artist’s exclusive rights. 
For example, an advertisement prominently featuring an artist’s 
tattoo will always meet the featured use test because of the 
inherent purpose of advertising—to catch the audience’s 
attention.171 The test honors the constitutional commitment to 
                                                                                                     
liability). The EA representative indicated that EA goes through an extensive 
legal process before developing a video game, which she indicated “kept [EA] out 
of trouble, basically.” See id. (describing EA’s development process for a video 
game as involving extensive copyright, trademark, and copying analysis).  
 168. See generally Rice, supra note 153 (advocating for a different set of 
rules for the video game industry, due to its unique and technologically 
progressive nature).  
 169. See King, supra note 11, at 132 (categorizing tattoo artists as a group 
that needs more protection under the law, especially because “no tattoo artist 
has yet been successful in receiving enforcement by the court of his copyright in 
a tattoo”).  
 170. See Heitner & Wilmot, supra note 6, at 318 (recognizing, timidly, the 
important differentiation between incidental use and purposeful use of the 
tattoo). “However, the inherent problem remains in determining whether the 
artist should benefit from any incidental use of the tattoo in a commercial 
setting . . . or if his commission should strictly stem from purposeful use of the 
tattoo . . . .” Id. 
 171. See infra notes 188–195 and accompanying text (explaining why Reed 
and Whitmill both clearly fit within the featured use test); Lorillard Tobacco Co. 
v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 578 (2001) (discussing the purposes of advertising, which 
include promoting a product and obtaining the target audience’s attention to sell 
that product); see also Harkins, supra note 60, at 332 (explaining that tattoo lore 
involves artists protecting their work but not favoring featured exposure of their 
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personal autonomy by eliminating liability for otherwise 
infringing acts associated with ordinary living.172 For a 
professional football player, incidental, nonfeatured uses of his 
tattoo include inadvertent displays at public events, during game 
broadcasts and newscasts, and even avatar appearances in video 
games—activities associated with the player’s lifestyle and 
career.173 Alternatively, featured uses of a player’s tattoo—
including purposeful uses in commercials, photographs, and other 
advertising materials—would violate the artist’s exclusive 
rights.174 Support for the rationale of the featured use test comes 
from a variety of sources.  
First, the lexicology behind the word “featured” illustrates its 
appropriateness in this context. The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines “featured” as “made a feature or special attraction” and 
defines its synonym “prominent” as “stand[ing] out so as to catch 
the attention; notable.”175 Similarly, the U.S. Department of 
Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles identifies a “featured 
player” as one who “receives prominent billing.”176 The Supreme 
Court has used “featured” to mean prominence as well, indicating 
its familiarity with the term.177 The Copyright Act also uses the 
                                                                                                     
work in advertisements).  
 172. See supra Part V.A (ordering the various competing rights at issue in 
the copyrightability of tattoos and concluding that personal autonomy trumps 
creative protections).  
 173. See GEORGE W. SCHUBERT, RODNEY K. SMITH & JESSE C. TRENTADUE, 
SPORTS LAW 126 (1986) (historicizing the increased “popularity of sporting 
activities and the athletes who participate in them” and pointing out the 
importance of advertising and related commercial activities for the sports 
business).  
 174. See infra notes 188–202 and accompanying text (exploring Reed, 
Whitmill, and Allen as examples of when featured uses of an artist’s tattoo in 
promotional materials constituted violations of the artist’s exclusive rights 
under the Copyright Act). 
 175. See 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 791 (2d ed. 1989) (listing a variety of 
definitions for “featured,” more typically used to describe someone’s 
appearance); 12 id. at 613 (defining “prominence” as “[s]tanding out so as to 
strike the eye; conspicuous”).  
 176. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES 159.047-018 
(4th ed., rev. 1991).  
 177. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 689 (2005) (discussing the 
eminence of Moses and the Ten Commandments in the District of Columbia, 
including a statue “prominently featured in the Chamber of the United States 
House of Representatives”); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 
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word to differentiate between various royalty rates.178 The Act 
defines “featured music” as “any performance of a musical work, 
whether live or recorded, that is the principal focus of audience 
attention,” the same concept this Note uses to define the featured 
use test.179 
Second, the Second Circuit created a similar test when 
analyzing whether the inclusion of art behind the scenes in 
television shows and films constituted copyright infringement or 
de minimis fair use.180 The court focused on the “observability of 
the copyrighted work in the allegedly infringing work” and the 
“prominence” of the copyrighted work in the film or show.181 The 
Second Circuit used this analysis in the context of artwork in 
films and television shows, but the distinction between 
out-of-focus, background use and lengthy, prominent, observable 
use analogizes nicely to this new test regarding tattoos and 
copyright.182 Due to the courts’ and the government’s familiarity 
                                                                                                     
471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (noting that although infringing material constituted 
less than one percent of the work, the infringing material was “prominently 
featured” and therefore violated the author’s exclusive rights); United States v. 
First Nat’l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 536 n.12 (1965) (using the turn of phrase 
“prominently featured” to indicate the position of preference of a theory in a 
petition for rehearing).  
 178. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 381.6(b)(1), 253.8(b)(1)(ii)(2) 
(2012) (using “featured” to describe certain displays that warrant higher royalty 
rates).  
 179. See id. § 381.6(b)(1) (distinguishing featured music from nonfeatured 
music, which includes incidental performances).  
 180. See Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 
1998) (reviewing a video copy of defendant’s movie to determine if the movie met 
the quantitative threshold for copyright infringement); Ringgold v. Black Entm’t 
Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1997) (“What defendants dispute when 
they assert that their use of the poster was de minimis is whether the admitted 
copying occurred to an extent sufficient to constitute actionable copying, i.e., 
infringement.”). 
 181. See Sandoval, 147 F.3d at 217 (“Observability is determined by the 
length of time the copyrighted work appears in the allegedly infringing work, 
and its prominence in that work . . . .”); Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 75 (listing the 
length of time that the copied work is observable in the allegedly infringing 
work and the prominence of its inclusion as factors to consider when 
determining infringement). 
 182. See supra note 181 (describing the two cases in which the Second 
Circuit has relied on the distinction between background use and featured use 
to determine if an activity qualified as a fair, de minimis use).  
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with the term “featured” as meaning prominent, its use in this 
new test is appropriate.183  
Third, the player’s right of publicity bolsters the validity of 
the featured use test. The right of publicity protects celebrities’ 
ability to profit from their own identities and personas.184 As soon 
as the ink dries, a tattoo becomes a permanent part of a client’s 
identity and persona, automatically incorporating into that 
player’s right of publicity.185 Any uses of the tattoo incidental to 
the client’s identity therefore warrant right of publicity 
protection, which permits the client to require consent before any 
profits resulting from use of his likeness and image.186 Featured 
uses surpass right-of-publicity protection, however, as they no 
longer merely accompany the client’s identity but become the 
“principal focus of the audience[’s] attention.”187 
                                                                                                     
 183. See supra notes 176–177 and accompanying text (sourcing definitions of 
“featured” from legal authorities to determine its appropriateness in this Note’s 
new standard for determining copyright infringement associated with tattoos); 
see also Rodney Distribs., Inc., 50 F.T.C. 11, 12 (1953) (accusing the corporation 
and its officers of misrepresenting the manufacturing location of their product 
by “featured use” of domestic names on the product); Nat’l Stores, 49 F.T.C. 
1450, 1451 (1953) (alleging that the corporation falsely advertised that it 
produced its machines domestically by featuring domestic brand names on the 
machines); Del Mar Sewing Mach. Co., 49 F.T.C. 1257, 1258 (1953) 
(representing “through the featured use of the words ‘Universal,’ ‘Majestic’ and 
other well known domestic trade or brand names” that the product remained 
connected to well known domestic firms); Merlino v. Schmetz, 20 A.2d 266, 267 
(R.I. 1941) (detailing plaintiff’s allegations as contending that the defendant’s 
“featured use of these words, in the peculiar setting and circumstances” 
amounted to unfair competition). 
 184. See Rice, supra note 153, at 324–26 (defining the right of publicity 
using the Haelan court’s rationale and Nimmer’s article entitled The Right of 
Publicity).  
 185. See Heitner & Wilmot, supra note 6, at 319 (noting ambiguity 
surrounding the intersection of copyright law, tattoos, and the right of publicity 
but rightfully characterizing a tattoo as part of a client’s “image and likeness”).  
 186. See Rice, supra note 153, at 324 (distinguishing the right of publicity 
from the right to privacy but emphasizing that the moral right theory of the 
right of publicity does give a player the right to choose what video games to 
appear in).   
 187. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 381.6(b)(1) (2012) (describing 
“featured music” for the purposes of determining royalty rates for using 
another’s copyrighted musical work); see also Heitner & Wilmot, supra note 6, at 
319 (“Further, allowing tattoo artists to sue athletes as part of their copyright 
infringement claims would seem to run contrary to the purpose of the right of 
publicity.”).   
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Last, two of the prominent cases analyzed in Part III clearly 
illustrate the value of the featured use test. In Reed, tattoo artist 
Reed acknowledged his desire for Wallace, the tattoo recipient, to 
violate Reed’s exclusive rights with nonfeatured uses of his 
tattoo, uses associated with Wallace’s career as an NBA 
basketball player.188 In his Complaint, Reed distinguished 
between featured and nonfeatured uses, too, stating, “Plaintiff is 
entitled to share in any revenue realized by Mr. Wallace as the 
result of any use, other than an incidental use, of the tattoo.”189 
Only after Reed became aware that “the tattoo he had applied to 
Mr. Wallace’s arm was being featured as part of an advertising 
campaign” did he institute an infringement suit against both 
Wallace and Nike.190  
Whitmill presents the same situation, with a slight twist on 
the facts.191 In Whitmill, Warner Brothers chose to feature a copy 
of Mike Tyson’s tattoo on another person altogether, clearly 
leaving the incidental-use realm by putting a replica of the tattoo 
on the face of an actor in the film.192 The plaintiff artist never 
objected to uses of the tattoo associated with Mike Tyson’s 
lifestyle, which included broadcasted boxing matches, movie 
appearances, and others.193 In fact, Tyson appeared in the series’ 
first installment, The Hangover, without any objection from 
                                                                                                     
 188. See Nike Complaint, supra note 14, at 4 (“Mr. Reed observed the tattoo 
during televised NBA games in which Mr. Wallace participated as a player. Mr. 
Reed expected that public display of the tattoo . . . .”). Reed considered such 
exposure both common and desirable in the tattoo industry. See id. (describing 
Reed’s positive feelings toward the incidental uses of Wallace’s tattoo during 
NBA broadcasts). 
 189. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).  
 190. See id. (describing how the commercial “features the tattoo filling the 
screen in a close up,” which ultimately led Reed to file suit) (emphasis added); 
see also robjv1, supra note 51 (depicting the commercial at issue in the case).  
 191. See Warner Brothers Complaint, supra note 15, at 4 (differing from 
Reed in that the infringer did not feature the tattoo as seen on the original 
recipient, Mike Tyson, but on someone else altogether).  
 192. See id. (recounting how “the Movie features a virtually exact 
reproduction of the Original Tattoo, which appears on the upper left side of the 
Stu Price Character’s face, played by actor Ed Helms”).  
 193. See About Mike Tyson, MIKE TYSON, http://www.miketyson.com/about 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (retelling Tyson’s immense career, which included 
multiple televised boxing matches, magazine articles featuring Tyson, and 
cameo appearances in movies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
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Whitmill.194 The sequel’s use of the tattoo in its advertising and 
plot line, however, quickly became a featured use, and only at the 
occurrence of this use did the artist instigate copyright 
infringement actions against Warner Brothers.195  
The application of the featured use test to Allen becomes 
slightly more nuanced. Like Reed and Whitmill, Allen’s 
Complaint admitted, “Defendant Ricky Williams was known to 
plaintiff as a professional football player, and [plaintiff] assumed 
he would see his art on television.”196 Allen also recognized that 
EA Sports chose to feature “defendant Ricky Williams and the 
tattoo art,” which at first glance appears as a use incidental to 
selecting Williams as the athlete to adorn the cover of the video 
games.197 Allen’s Complaint, however, explicitly recognizes the 
difference between featured uses on the covers of the games and 
Williams’s other “incidental use[s]” of the tattoo.198  
An empirical analysis supports the same conclusion 
regarding the covers of the popular video games.199 Each cover 
includes only an avatar of Williams, but each avatar’s placement 
emphasizes Williams’s tattoos, transitioning the use from 
nonfeatured to featured.200 Additionally, EA Sports used the 
tattoo to advertise the game, just like Warner Brothers’ movie 
posters for The Hangover: Part II and Nike’s commercial 
featuring Wallace’s tattoos.201 Advertisements intentionally grab 
                                                                                                     
 194. See Warner Brothers Hearing, supra note 72, at 2 (observing that the 
first movie only showed Mr. Tyson’s face, to which Whitmill did not object, but 
that the second movie used the tattoo on another character’s face). Without 
objection from Whitmill, Mr. Tyson also played a minor role in the sequel. Id. 
 195. See Warner Brothers Complaint, supra note 15, at 5 (“The Pirated 
Tattoo is prominently featured in the marketing and promotional materials for 
the Movie . . . .”).  
 196. Electronic Arts Complaint, supra note 16, at 3. 
 197. See id. at Exhibits 2–3 (featuring Ricky Williams on the cover of NFL 
Street and Madden NFL 10 and 11) (emphasis added).  
 198. See id. at 7 (requesting “[a]n accounting of the revenue realized by Mr. 
Williams as the result of any use, other than an incidental use, of the tattoo” 
(emphasis added)).  
 199. See id. at Exhibit 2 (positioning Williams’s body on the cover of the 
game so that his tattooed bicep becomes the focal point of the audience’s 
attention).  
 200. See id. (placing Williams on the cover in a manner that emphasizes his 
tattoos, not just his person).  
 201. Compare id. at 5 (seeking damages according to EA Sports’ profits from 
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the attention of the audience by prominently featuring certain 
material and almost always result in featured, infringing uses of 
the tattoo artist’s copyrighted tattoo.202  
VI. Conclusion 
The state of the law regarding the copyrightability of tattoos 
demands a new and innovative approach.203 No court has spoken 
definitively on the matter, and the utter lack of precedent creates 
confusion for artists, players, and sports industries alike.204 
Scholars attempted to resolve the problem with legally 
impractical answers—defenses that no client or video game could 
ever successfully plead.205 Left with no common law or scholarly 
authority to rely on, the featured use test emerges as the fourth 
quarter Hail Mary that this predicament desperately needs.206  
The featured use test harmonizes the competing interests of 
the player, the artist, and the video game and presents each 
constituency with a predictable, workable answer to their 
respective copyright concerns.207 The test allows video games to 
include players’ body art in nonfeatured, less noticeable ways 
                                                                                                     
featuring plaintiff’s work on the cover of its highly successful games), with 
Warner Brothers Complaint, supra note 15, at 5 (emphasizing that Warner 
Brothers featured the infringing version of the tattoo to market and promote the 
film), and Nike Complaint, supra note 14, at 4 (objecting to Wallace and Nike 
creating a commercial that featured Reed’s tattoo art without his permission).  
 202. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (explaining the purpose of 
advertisements and how they inherently become featured uses of an artist’s 
work due to their nature). 
 203. See Perzanowski, supra note 124, at 514 (observing that the law 
surrounding the tattoo industry must account for “a more complex set of 
relationships” than other intersections with copyright law).  
 204. See Warner Brothers Hearing, supra note 72, at 2 (addressing orally 
the merits of plaintiff’s copyright infringement case against Warner Brothers 
and evaluating Warner Brothers’ defenses against the suit).  
 205. See supra Part IV (identifying the four most commonly suggested 
resolutions by other scholars and critiquing them for their lack of practicality for 
defendants).  
 206. See supra Part V (announcing the featured use test and describing its 
timeliness and usefulness).  
 207. See supra notes 152–157 and accompanying text (cataloging the 
interests of the different parties involved in copyrighting tattoos and concluding 
that not all interests can prevail simultaneously).  
1988 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1947 (2015) 
without fearing a lawsuit, while simultaneously protecting tattoo 
artists from exploitative featured uses of their original art. Most 
importantly, the featured use test removes any doubt about the 
player’s personal autonomy over his lifestyle and career. Courts 
should adopt this standard while they have the requisite 
discretion, as the issue remains one of first impression.208  
                                                                                                     
 208. See Heitner & Wilmot, supra note 6, at 317 (“[U]ntil a case produces a 
direct order stating how copyright right [sic] law shall apply, all other views are 
seen as merely dicta for courts to adopt at their discretion.”). 
